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THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION: FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA,ONLY STATEHOOD WILL DO
MaryM. Cheh*
INTRODUCTION
TheDistrictofColumbiasuffersuniquelyforitsposition astheseatofthe
nationalgovernment. Becauseitisnotastate, itdoesnotqualifyforcongressional
representationandhasnovoteinthenationallegislature, evenastomatersaffecting
entirelylocalinterests.1 Indeed, Article1, Section8 oftheU.S. Constitutionvests
Congress with the power to exercise exclusive legislation in al cases whatsoever
overtheDistrict, whichpermitsCongresstopasslawsrangingfrom budgetcontrolto
streetsweeping.2 ThefactthattheDistrictexercisesanylocalauthorityatalarises
from permissiongrantedtoitbyCongress.3
Indeed, the Districts uniquely impoverished democracy renders its situation even
worsethanthatoftheterritories. LikeresidentsoftheDistrict, peoplelivinginU.S.
territorieshavenorighttovoteformembersofCongress, theirlawsmaybenullified
byCongress, and, althoughtheymaysendadelegatetoCongress, thedelegatehas
novote.4 But, unlikeaterritory, theDistricthasnohistoricallysettledpathtostate-
hood.5 TheDistricthasalwaysbeengeographicallypartoftheUnion, anditscitizens
previouslyexercised, butthenlost, therighttovoteformembersofthenational
* ElyceZenoffProfessorofLaw, TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversityLaw School;
Member, CounciloftheDistrictofColumbia;L.L.M., HarvardUniversity, 1977;J.D.,
RutgersUniversity, 1975;B.A., RutgersUniversity, 1972. Theauthorwouldliketothank
formerstudentsMeganBrown, J.D., GeorgeWashingtonUniversityLaw School, 2013 and
JonathanWillingham, J.D., GeorgeWashingtonUniversityLaw School, 2006.
1 See generally PeterRaven-Hansen, Congressional Representation for the District of
Columbia:A Constitutional Analysis, 12 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 167, 17479 (1975) [hereinafter
Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation](discussingthedisenfranchisingeffectofthe
1801 legislationthatprovidedfortheformationofthefederalDistrict).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 17;see, e.g., Neildv. DistrictofColumbia, 110 F.2d246,
25051 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (finding the District Clause gives Congress broad control over the
Districts affairs, allowing it to legislate on an array of issues).
3 HomeRuleAct, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973);see infra PartIII.C.
4 2 U.S.C. §25a(2012).
5 See D.C. Statehood:Hearingon H.R. 51Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Affairs &
Health of the H. Comm. on the District of Columbia, 100thCong. 228 (1987) (statement
ofSen. EdwardKennedy) [hereinafterStatementofSen. Kennedy](notingthethreehis-
torically recognized conditions for admission to statehood: commitment to the principles
ofdemocracy, resourcesandpopulationsufficienttosupportstatehood, andthewillofthe
people for statehood).
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legislature.6 ResidentsoftheDistrictmustpayindividualfederalincometaxeswhile,
broadlyspeaking, thosewhoresideinaterritoryareexemptfrom suchtaxation.7
Perhapsmostoffensive, however, isthepropensityofmembersofCongresstouse
theDistrictasapoliticalplaything. Forexample, membershavechosentotrumpet
their opposition to financing poor womens abortions, needle exchanges, or medical
marijuanabyprohibitinglocalinitiativesthatwouldsupportsuchmeasures.8
This Essay posits that the only complete legal and moral remedy for the Districts
politicalsubjugationisstatehood, anditexplainswhyremediesshortofstatehood
areinadequate. TheEssaythenidentifiesthevariouspathstostatehood. Finally, it
discussesthestrategicdilemmaoftheDistricteitherholdingoutexclusivelyforstate-
hoodorproceedinginincrementalstepsonthatpath.
I. THE CASE FOR STATEHOOD
The646,000 residentsoftheDistrictofColumbia,9 unliketheresidentsofany
otherdemocraticcapitalintheworld, havenovoteintheirnationallegislature.10 And
thislegislature, theCongressoftheUnitedStates, exercisescompletedominionover
6 See Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation, supra note1, at174.
7 U.S. Insular Areas:Information on Fiscal Relations with the Federal Government:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Native Am. & Insular Affairs of the H. Comm. on Res.,
104thCong. 17779 (1995) (statement of Natwar M. Gandhi) (noting that residents of the United
States five insular territories do not pay federal income tax on earnings within the territories).
8 See BenPershing, Budget Deal Reminds D.C. that Congress is in Charge, WASH.
POST, Apr. 10, 2011, atA10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dc-wire
/post/sources-budget-deal-includes-dc-abortion-rider-money-for-school-vouchers
/2011/04/08/AF3ET24C_blog.html(describinghow Republicansincludedbansonneedle
exchangeanduseoflocalfundsforabortionsaspartofbudgetdealtoavoidagovernment
shutdown);PhillipSmith, Medical Marijuana:U.S. House Overturns Barr Amendment,
Removes Obstacle to Implementing1998D.C. Vote, STOP DRUG WAR (July17, 2009, 12:00
AM), http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2009/jul/17/medical_marijuana_us_house_overt
(reportingthatbecausetheBarramendmentwasoverturned, theDistricthasbeenableto
allowfortheuseofmedicalmarijuana);see also Tim Craig, D.C. Wire:Medical Marijuana
Now Legal, WASH. POST (July27, 2010, 12:13 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc
/2010/07/medical_marijuana_now_legal.html (noting that the Districts medical marijuana
law passed when Congress declined to intervene).
9 AaronWiener, D.C. Population Boom Continued in 2013, WASH.CITY PAPER (Dec. 30,
2013, 11:21 AM), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2013/12/30
/d-c-population-boom-continued-in-2013/.
10 See Tim Craig, Obama to Use D.C. Taxation Without Representation License Plates,
WASH. POST. (Jan. 16, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics
/obama-to-use-dc-taxation-without-representation-license-plates/2013/01/15/f91b09ac-5f5b-11e2
-9940-6fc488f3fecd_story.html ([A]fter living in the city for four years [President Obama] has
seen how patently unfair it is for working families in D.C. to work hard, raise children and pay
taxes, without having a vote in Congress.).
2014] THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION 67
Districtresidents.11 Becauseofthissubordination, theDistrictissometimescalled
the last colony.12 Thiscurrent, abjectconditionwasneverenvisionedandneverin-
tendedbytheFramerswhentheydraftedtheDistrictClauseoftheConstitutiongiving
Congress full power [t]o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever13
overtheDistrict.14
A. History of the District
Tounderstandhowthisdemocraticanomalycametobe, wehavetoreturnto1783
andtheConfederationCongress. InJuneofthatyear, Congress, sitinginIndependence
HalinPhiladelphia, wasbesiegedbysoldiersoftheContinentalArmydemandingback
pay.15 Althoughtheactualdangerofthemutinywaslikelyexaggeratedbyfederalists
whosoughtastrongcentralgovernment,16 and historians do not agree on various de-
tails of what happened,17 itisclearthatCongressaskedPennsylvaniaforprotection18
andPennsylvaniarefused.19 Facedwiththeinabilitytoexpeditiouslyprotectitself,20
theCongressadjournedandremovedtoPrinceton, New Jersey.21 Whendraftingthe
Constitutionamerefouryearslater, membersoftheConstitutionalConventionwere
farmoreconcernedwithcreatingafederalseatthatcouldprotectthefederalgovern-
mentthanconsideringwhethertheresidentsofthatseatwouldberepresentedinthe
Congresstheywerecreating.22
11 See, e.g., Pershing, supra note 8 (noting that Congress is in charge and that the
District has precious little control over its finances).
12 See, e.g., StatementofSen. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 227 (The time has come in
Americas bicentennial year to end the unacceptablestatusoftheDistrictofColumbiaas
Americas last colony.).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 17.
14 See infra notes 12425 and accompanying text.
15 KENNETH R. BOWLING, THE CREATION OF WASHINGTON D.C.: THE IDEA AND
LOCATION OF THE AMERICAN CAPITAL 3032 (1991) (describing an armed demonstration of
morethan250 Continentalsoldiersseekingbackpayfrom thePennsylvaniangovernment
andsurroundingabuildingfullofnotonlystatebutfederalcongressmen).
16 Id. at34.
17 MarkS. Scarberry, Historical Considerations and Congressional Representation for
the District of Columbia:Constitutionality of the D.C. House VotingRights Bill in Light of
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and the History of the Creation of the District,
60 ALA. L. REV. 783, 871 (2009).
18 BOWLING, supra note15, at32;see also Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation,
supra note1, at169.
19 BOWLING, supra note15, at32.
20 Although, atonepoint, CongressconsideredorderingGeneralGeorgeWashingtonto
marchtroopsonthecity. Id. at33.
21 Id. at 3334.
22 Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation, supra note 1, at 17172, 178.
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LackofconcernfortheresidentsoftheDistrictwasperhapsnotaglaringdefect
atthetime. In1790, theDistrictwaslittlemorethanaswamp, withsignificantset-
tlementsonlyatGeorgetownandAlexandria.23 Evenin1800, twelveyearsafterthe
ratificationoftheConstitution, thetotalpopulationoftheDistricthadonlyrisento
14,093.24 As Representative Randolph of Virginia would note in 1803, [t]he other
statescanneverbebroughttoconsentthattwosenatorsand, atleast, threeelectors
of the President, shall be chosen out of this small spot, and by a handful of men.25
By1960, however, whenthepopulationoftheDistricthadrisentoover760,000,26
thenationrealizedthatthefoundationofthatstatementhadcrumbled. Thiswassig-
nifiedbytheratificationoftheTwenty-ThirdAmendmenttotheConstitution, alow-
ingtheDistricttovoteforelectorsforPresidentoftheUnitedStates.27
TheFramerscouldnothaveforeseenthattheDistrictwouldgrow toapopula-
tiongreaterthanbothWyomingandVermontandclosetothepopulationsofseveral
otherstates.28 Theycould nothaveimagined stateslikeWyoming and Vermont
sharingfoursenatorsandtworepresentativesbetweenthem, whilehundredsofthou-
sandsofresidentsoftheDistrictremaineddisenfranchised. Anditisincongruous
tothinkthattheFramers, havingjustfoughtawartoensurethattherewouldbeno
taxationwithoutrepresentation, wouldenshrineintheConstitutionthatsamedis-
abilityonsuchasignificantpopulationoftheirowncountrymen. Now, inthetwenty-
firstcentury, toachieveequalityanddignityofcitizenshipforDistrictresidentsfully
onparwithallothercitizensoftheUnitedStates, statehoodistheonlycompleteand
adequateanswer.
23 See S. REP. NO. 67-507, at 1314 (1922).
24 Id. at14, cited in Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation, supra note1, at177.
Atthetimeofthe1800 Census, thepopulationoftheDistrictwasnotcountedseparately, but
ratherincludedinthetotalsforMarylandandVirginia, respectively, fortheircededland.
AlthoughtheVirginiadataappearstobelost, theMarylanddatareflectsapopulationof
8,144 inthe1800 census. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 23. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIARACE
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1800 TO 1990, available at http://www.census.gov/population
/www/documentation/twps0056/tab23.pdf(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014) [hereinafterRACE AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN].
25 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 499 (1803), quoted in Raven-Hansen, Congressional Repre-
sentation, supra note1, at178.
26 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA POPULATION OF COUNTIES BY
DECENNIAL CENSUS: 1900 TO 1990, available at htp:/www.census.gov/population/cencounts
/dc190090.txt(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, §1.
28 See Wiener, supra note9. Wyominghasapopulationof582,658 people, andVermont
hasapopulationof626,630 people. Id. AlaskaandNorthDakotahavepopulationsof735,132
peopleand723,393 people, respectively. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK-
FACTS:ALASKA, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html(lastvisited
Oct. 23, 2014);U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: NORTH DAKOTA,
available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/38000.html(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
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B. Creatinga New State
WhenterritoriesareadmittedtotheUnion, they are admitted under the Equal
Footing Doctrine.29 Thatis, anew stateacquiresthesamepower, dignity, and
authorityofeveryotherstate, andthatequalitymaynotthereafterbecompromised.30
IftheDistrictwereadmitedtotheUnionasastate, ittoowouldbeonequalfooting
withalotherstates. Suchequalityisnotconferredforthebenefitofthegovern-
mentit is conferred for the people so that they might exercise the ful powers of a
localsovereign: thepowertopasscivilandcriminallaws, totax, toinsurethehealth,
safety, andwelfareoftheirresidentstothesameextentasalotherstates, andto
participateinthenationalgovernmentonequalterms.31
Thethreehistoricalyrecognizedconditionsforterritoriestobeadmittedtothe
Unionarecommitmenttodemocracy, thewilofthepeople, andresourcesandpopu-
lationsufficienttosupportstatehood.32 Thereisnoquestionthattheresidentsofthe
Districtarefulycommitedtodemocraticgovernance. Theyhaveembracedevery
HomeRule33 opportunity(impoverishedasitmaybe), toexercisetherighttovoteand
chooserepresentativesbasedondemocraticprinciples.34 And the Districts desire to
assumestatehoodisreflectedintheoverwhelmingsupportofareferendum seeking
entryintotheUnion.35 Districtresidentsratifiedstateconstitutionsin1982 and1987
referringtotheproposedstateofNew Columbia.36 Since1990, theyhavealsovoted
forshadow representationinCongresstoadvancestatehood.37
Althoughthereishopeformoreexpansivepopularaction,38 suchaslargedemon-
strationsandprotests, thereremainsaconstantundercurrentofagitationforstatehood.
29 See, e.g., JohnnyBarnes, Towards Equal Footing:Respondingto the Perceived Consti-
tutional Legal and Practical Impediments to Statehood for the District of Columbia, 13 UDC/
DCSL L. REV. 1, 45 (2010) (describing the components of the Equal Footing Doctrine).
30 Coylev. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911).
31 Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 16768 (1886).
32 StatementofSen. Kennedy, supra note5, at228.
33 Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774;see infra PartIII.C.
34 Districtvotersapproved thecreationofanelected AttorneyGeneralposition by
referendum in2010. Patrick Madden, D.C. Council Pushes Back Election of Attorney
General to 2018, WAMU 88.5 (Oct. 2, 2013), http://wamu.org/news/13/10/02/dc_council
_pushes_back_election_of_attorney_general_to_2018.
35 See LawrenceM. Frankel, National Representation for the District of Columbia:A
Legislative Solution, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 167879 n.76 (1991) (noting that D.C.
residents in 1980 approved an initiative calling for statehood by a margin of 60% to 40%).
36 D.C. CONST. of1982, pmbl.;D.C. CONST. of1987, pmbl.
37 WillSommer, Shadow of a Doubt, WASH. CITY PAPER (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www
.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/44734/shadow-of-a-doubt-dc-statehood-activists/.
38 JaminB. Raskin, Domination, Democracy, and the District:The Statehood Position,
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 417, 41718 (1990) (proposing a popular movement to accelerate the
statehood initiative process with mass organizing andpublicprotesttodramatizeandtrans-
form the Districts oppressed condition).
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ThecurrentMayorand Councilroutinelycallforstatehood: theMayor, council
members, andagroupofcitizenswererecentlyarrestedprotestingCongressional
interferenceinlocallawmaking,39 andthereisasteadydrumbeatofadvocacyby
activistsandgroupsinfavorofstatehood.40
Butwhatofthethirdrequirement;doestheDistricthavethepopulationand
resourcestosupportstatehood? Asalreadyindicated, thepopulationoftheDistrict
exceedsthepopulationsofWyomingandVermont, anditisgrowing.41 Estimates
are that the Districts population is increasing by approximately 1,000 to 1,200
residentspermonth, andprojectionsarethatitwillcontinueonthistrajectoryfor
decades.42 AndcontrarytosomeofthemythspropagatedabouttheDistrict, its
populationisnotentirelyorevenlargelymadeupoftransientmilitarypersonnelor
federalworkers.43 Like any other thriving state, the Districts population is made up
offamilies, children, singles, youngprofessionals, white- andblue-collarworkers,
seniorcitizens, andstudents.44 TheDistrictishometodistinctandthrivingneighbor-
hoods, universities, professionalsportsteams, smallbusinesses, banks, agrowing
technologysector, andbusinessheadquarters.45 TherobustpopulationoftheDistrict
39 See DC Mayor Uses March Rally to Call for DC Statehood, AP (Aug. 28, 2013), http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/dc-mayor-uses-march-rally-call-dc-statehood;BenPershing, Mayor,
Council Members Are Arrested:DC Rally Protests Budget Bill Riders that Restrict City
Spending, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2011, atA1, A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/local/politics/gray-council-members-arrested-at-protest-of-dc-riders-in-spending-bill
/2011/04/11/AFRWPBND_story.html.
40 See generally www.dcvote.org(a501(c)(3), web-basedorganizationdedicated to
securingvotingrightsforDistrictresidents).
41 See supra note28 andaccompanyingtext.
42 See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/11000.html(showingapopu-
lationgrowthfrom 601,767 in2010 to646,449 in2013, agrowthofapproximately1,240
residentspermonth);see also DEPT OF CMTY. PLANNING & SERVS., METRO WASHINGTON
COUNCIL OF GOVTS, PUB. NO. 20138465, ROUND 8.2 COOPERATIVE FORECASTING:
POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD FORECASTS TO 2040 BY TRAFFIC ANALYSIS ZONE v(2013),
available at http://www.mwcog.org/publications/departmental.asp?CLASSIFICATION_ID
=6&SUBCLASSIFICATION_ID=27 (showinganestimatedDistrictofColumbiapopulation
growth, from 601,720 in2010 to771,162 in2040).
43 10Myths about the District of Columbia, DC VOTE, https://www.dcvote.org/inside
-dc/10-myths-about-district-columbia(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014) (findingoverfiftypercent
ofresidentshavelivedintheDistrictfortwentyyearsormore).
44 See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF PLANNING, DC FACTS 2013, available at
http://planning.dc.gov/DC/Planning/DC+Data+and+Maps/DC+Data/DC+Quick+Facts
/DC+Facts+2013 (lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
45 See, e.g., DC NEIGHBORHOODS, http://washington.org/topics/neighborhoods(last
visitedOct. 23, 2014) (hostinganinteractivewebsitedescribingthesightsandfeaturesof
the Districts various neighborhoods); 2012Top DC Companies, WASH. POST, http://apps
.washingtonpost.com/local/top-dc-companies/2012/(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014) (clicktwice
on the city columns to see the Districts top companies grouped by sector).
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includesresidentswhohaveservedandcontinuetoserveintheArmedForces,46 and
Districtresidentspayfederalincometaxeswelbeyondtheaveragepercapitapayment
ofmostotherstates.47
Economically, the District is strong. The Districts total government budgetis
over$12 billion, ofwhichapproximately$7 billionisentirelylocalfunds.48 Itscur-
rent general obligation bond credit rating is an A2 from Moodys Investors Service
and an A- from both Standard and Poors and Fitch Ratings.49 The Districts balance
sheet, anditsabilitytomeettheneedsofitscitizenswouldbeevenmorerobustif
CongressdidnotprohibittheDistrictfrom taxingtheincomeofpeoplewhowork
intheDistrictbutdonotlivethere.50 EverystateintheUnioncanimposeanon-
residentincometaxinsuchcases. Giventhatoverhalfoftheincomeearnedinthe
Districtisearnedbynon-Districtresidents,51 thisprohibitioncreatesatwobillion
dollarimbalance,52 aproblem thatcouldbeimmediatelyrectifiediftheDistrictwere
astate.53
ContrarytoanothermythabouttheDistrict, theDistrictisnottoofinancially
dependentonthefederalgovernmentandwouldbeabletostandonitsownasa
46 OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 2011 DEMOGRAPHICS: PROFILE
OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY 32, 82 (2012), available at http://www.militaryonesource.mil
/12038/MOS/Reports/2011_Demographics_Report.pdf.
47 See BenPershing, Decades-longEffort to Exempt D.C. Residents from U.S. Income Tax
Still Simmers, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2013, atC7, available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/local/dc-politics/decades-long-effort-to-exempt-dc-residents-from-us-income-tax-still
-simmers/2013/04/13/2b364794-a3b8-11e2-be47-b44febada3a8_story.html.
48 See OFFICE OFTHECHIEFFIN.OFFICER,GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICTOFCOLUMBIA FY
2014 APPROVED BUDGET GROSS FUNDS 6 (2014), available at http:/cfo.dc.gov/sites/default
/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/atachments/FY14_Approved_Budget.pdf.
49 Debt Management, OFFICE OF THE CHIEFFIN.OFFICER, http://app.cfo.dc.gov/info/debt
_management/index.shtm(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014);MikeDebonis, D.C. Wins Bond Rating
Upgrade from S&P, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/mike-debonis/wp/2013/03/21/d-c-wins-bond-rating-upgrade-from-sp/(quotingS&P ashaving
said that it upgraded the Districts ratings in recognition of its improved financial position
thathasbeenstrengthenedbyrecentstrongrevenueperformanceaswellastherebuilding
ofreservesinaccordancewith. . . recentlyadopted new reserve policies). It is true that the
Districtsufferedfinancialreversesinthe1990s, butsimilardifficultieshavefacedother
jurisdictionsbeforeandafter.
50 See, e.g., JennyReed, What Would a Commuter Tax Mean for DC?, D.C. FISCAL
POLYINST. (July26, 2012), http://www.dcfpi.org/what-would-a-commuter-tax-mean-for-dc
(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014). Thisiscommonly, though mistakenly, referred to as a commuter
taxa term which will be used, however reluctantly, in the balance of this Essay.
51 D.C. OFFICE OF REVENUE ANALYSIS, COMMUTER BITE OUT OF INCOME EARNED IN DC
IS THE SMALLEST IN 40 YEARS (2013), available at http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc
/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/2013-1%20--%20Commuters.pdf.
52 Reed, supra note50.
53 See id. (noting that the Districts ability to raise revenue is impaired by its ability to
impose a commuter tax).
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state. Yes, theDistrictdoeshaveaneconomicadvantageinthattheseatofthe
federalgovernmentishere, and thatprovidesacertain measureofresiliencyin
economicdownturns;but, thisisanadvantagealsoenjoyedbynearbyVirginiaand
Maryland. ThefederalgovernmentisnoteventheprincipalemployerintheDistrict.54
Asawhole, moreDistrictresidentsareemployedinthefieldsofeducation, health
care, hospitalityandtourism, andprofessionalservices, eventhoughthefederalgov-
ernmentremainsthesinglelargestemployerintheDistrict.55 Althoughgeographically
smal, the Districts economy has the depth and diversity to justify statehood.
Beyondmaterialconditions, itisimportanttoaddthemoralimperativefor
statehood. ResidentsoftheDistrictoftenobservethattheUnitedStatesgovernment
isachampionofdemocracyandself-determinationforcountriesaroundtheworld.
Yet, intheshadow oftheCapitol, hundredsofthousandsofcitizensaredeniedself-
governmentandvotingrightsequivalenttoallothersinthecountry. Thiscondition
hasbeendecriedinmanyarticles, speeches, andpresentations, anditshistoricalroots
aside, itcanonlybeseenasaprofoundinjustice.56
II. ALTERNATIVE MODES OF REPRESENTATION AND AUTONOMY
A. The District Has a Delegate to the House of Representatives
Beginninginthe1970s, CongressaccordedtheDistrictacertaindegreeofauton-
omyoveritslocalaffairsandaform ofrepresentationintheHouseofRepresentatives.57
TheseactionscreateanilusionofequalcitizenshipforDistrictresidents;but, because
theyareneithercompletenorpermanentformsofrelief, theyactuallyservetoperpet-
uate the Districts second class status.58 Theseactionshavegivenrisetoavarietyof
54 See DC FACTS 2013, supra note44 (findingonly28.6% ofemployedD.C. residents
weregovernmentemployees).
55 D.C. DEPT. OF EMPT. SERVS., DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOY-
MENT BY INDUSTRY AND PLACE OF WORK (2013), available at http:/does.dc.gov/sites/default
/files/dc/sites/does/publication/attachments/CESdc1Dec13.pdf(estimatingthatapproximately
373,000D.C.residentsworkinnon-financial-sectorprivate-employerjobswhileapproximately
200,000 workforthefederalgovernment).
56 See, e.g., Sen. OrrinG. Hatch, No Right More Precious in a Free Country: Allowing
Americans in the District of Columbia to Participate in National Self-Government, 45 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 287 (2008) (concluding that the Districts disenfranchisement is an injustice
that has lasted far too long); Raskin, supra note38, at417 (describingtheDistrictas
Americas last colony full of second-class citizens); Aaron E. Price, Sr., Comment, A
Representative Democracy:An Unfulfilled Ideal for Citizens of the District of Columbia, 7
UDC/DCSL L. REV. 77, 78 (2003).
57 See generally Price, supra note 56, at 8488 (outlining the historical progression of
Home Rule and D.C.s non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives, and arguing that
both are insufficient for guarding the Districts interests before Congress).
58 See Raskin, supra note 38, at 42526 (discussing the insufficiency of suffrage solutions
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argumentsthat, inoneform oranother, positthatDistrictresidentsarewellrepre-
sentedundercurrentarrangementsandthatstatehoodisunnecessary. A closelook
beliesthatnotion.
In1970, CongressprovidedtheDistrictwithadelegateintheHouseofRepresen-
tatives, electedeverytwoyearsbythepeopleoftheDistrict.59 Shemayparticipatein
debates, buthasnovote.60 Atonetime, from 1996 to2007, theHousepermittedthe
DelegatetovoteintheCommiteeoftheWholewiththeprovisothat, ifthevotewere
everdecisive, itwouldnotcount.61 Thepositionisheldinsuchlow esteem byother
House members that, on several occasions, the Districts current delegate, Eleanor
HolmesNorton, hasbeendeniedtheopportunitytotestifybeforeaHousesubcommit-
teeonlegislationdirectlyaffectingtheDistrict.62
Politicaltheoristsarguethatrepresentationcomesinmanyformsandthatthe
representativeneednotbeelectedorhaveavoteinabody.63 Thismaybethecase, for
example, where a non-elected person represents a national government in a global
institution or forum. The delegates role is to inform the body of the principals views
andtoregisterthatinformationbyvoteorotherwise.64 Suchrepresentationisautho-
rized, accountable, and deemed adequate to represent anothers interests.65 Thistheory
isfundamentallyflawedasa response to the Districts current position of subordi-
nation. ItistruethatthepeopleoftheDistrictsendadelegatetoCongress, butthat
representation, although certainly not meaningless,66 isincapableofparryingthe
shortofstatehood, andnotingthatDistrictresidents would not endure [such] indignities and
injustices [] if not for their own political impotence).
59 2 U.S.C. §25a(2012).
60 Id.
61 Michelv. Anderson, 817 F. Supp. 126, 142 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 14 F.3d623 (D.C. Cir.
1994);ArjunGarg, A Capital Idea:Legislation to Give the District of Columbia a Vote in the
House of Representatives, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 n.4 (2007);BenPershing,
Norton Fails in Effort to Prevent Loss of Committee of the Whole Vote, WASH. POST (Jan. 5,
2011), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc/2011/01/norton_effort_to_prevent_loss.html.
62 PerryStein, House GOP Again Tries to Restrict Abortion in D.C., WASH. CITY PAPER
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/citydesk/2014/01/09/house-gop
-again-tries-to-restrict-abortion-in-d-c/;QuinnWonderling, They Did It Again:GOP Refuses
to Hear Congresswomans Testimony on DC Abortion Bill, MSNBC (Sept. 6, 2013), http://
www.msnbc.com/msnbc/they-did-it-again-gop-refuses-hear-c?lite=.
63 See generally, e.g., J. RolandPennock, Political Representation:An Overview, in
REPRESENTATION: YEARBOOK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 8 (J. RolandPennock& JohnW. Chapmaneds., 1968).
64 See e.g., DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 26063 (2001) (describing Congresss
appointmentoffivemen, includingJohnJay, tonegotiatepeacewithGreatBritainin1781
inParisaftertheRevolutionaryWar).
65 See e.g., id. at 45657 (describing how thepeacetreatybrokeredwithGreatBritainby
John Jay went to the Senate in 1795 with George Washingtons approval despite its having
terms that would ignite a storm of protest).
66 Forinstance, DelegateEleanorHolmesNortonhasworkedwithRepresentativeDarrell
Issa, ChairmanoftheHouseOversightandGovernmentReform Committee, tobringbudget
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many ways that Congress can interfere in District affairsinterference that would
beimpermissibleiftheDistrictwereastate.67 Andevenonitsownterms, thistheory
of representation cannot respond to the circumstances of the District: the Districts
delegatemaybeauthorizedinthatsheiselected, butauthorizedtodowhat? She
simplydoesnotstandonequalfootingwiththeotherrepresentativesandtheycan,
anddo, ignoreheratwill.
Evenifthedelegateweregiventherighttovote, thesituationwouldnotbe
muchimproved. ThedelegateisonlyarepresentativeintheHouse, withonevote.
TheDistrictwouldstilllacktwoSenators, andthuslacktheinfluenceandpowerof
twovotesinthatmuchsmalerbody. Moreover, whatCongressgives, Congresscan
takeaway.
B. The District Is RepresentedBy All Members of Congress
Theargumenthereproceedsfrom theflip sideoftheprincipleofpolitical
accountabilityendorsed in McCulloch v. Maryland.68 Thatis, althoughthepart
cannotcontrolthewhole, thewholecancontrolthepart. InMcCulloch, theSupreme
Courtruledthatthestate(thepart) couldnottaxinstrumentalitiesofthefederal
government(thewhole).69 But, conversely, thefederalgovernment(thewhole) could
taxthestate(thepart).70 In the same vein, the argument runs, Congressall of its
representativescan speak for the District, with the many looking out for the few.
Although theoretically thiscould beso, thereisno accountability to thefew.
Congressional representatives need not account for the Districts needs or act in its
bestinterests.71 Infact, theDistricthassometimesbeenusedbyCongressasakind
ofpetridishtogrow programsnotembracedbytheDistrictresidents.72 Inthis
autonomytotheDistrict. PressRelease, EleanorHolmesNorton, NortontoContinueto
DefendBudgetAutonomyReferendum, FollowingGAO Opinion(Jan. 30, 2014), available
at htp:/norton.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/norton-to-continue-to-defend-budget
-autonomy-referendum-following-gao. Significantly, heradvocacyresultedinashutdown-
avoidanceprovisionfortheDistrictbeingincludedinthefiscalyear2014 omnibusappro-
priationsbill. Id.
67 See generally, e.g., Printzv. UnitedStates, 521 U.S. 898 (1996);New Yorkv. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 17476, 180(1992) (holdingrespectivelythatCongresscanneitherenforce
federal law against the states own citizens nor commandeer a states executive officers).
68 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
69 Id. at 36062, 398.
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 38, at 421 (Without any meaningful voice in the legis-
lative process . . . the people of the District have no check against legislative tyranny.).
72 In the 1990s under thenHouse Speaker Newt Gingrich, a Republican task force on the
DistrictpushedfortaxcutsandschoolvoucherprogramsthatwereunpopularwithDistrict
residents. Sommer, supra note37. SuchunwantedinterferencecontinuestothisdaywithSenator
Rand Paul attaching a loosening of the Districts gun control laws as an amendment to a budget 
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regard, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich identified the District as a labora-
tory for the Republican Partys pet policies such as school vouchers and certain tax
policies.73 Morerecently, SenatorRandPaulobservedthatcongressionalcontrolover
the District gave representatives the opportunity to draw attention to some issues
that have national implications.74
TheideathattheentireCongresscouldactuallyrepresentDistrictresidents
perhapsmadesenseatthebeginningoftheRepublic. In1800, whenDistrictresi-
dentsweredisenfranchisedaspartofthelaw transferringfullauthorityfrom the
statescedinglandtothefederalgovernmenttocreatetheDistrict, theassumption
wasthatCongresswouldcarefortheresidentsandthattheresidentswouldbeable
todirectlylobbyCongress.75 In1801, RepresentativeDennis, remarkingontheHouse
floor about District residents, suggested that [f]rom their contiguity to, and resi-
denceamongthemembersoftheGeneralGovernment, theyknew, thatthoughthey
might not be represented in the national body, their voice would be heard.76 And
thismadesensegiventhattheHouseofRepresentativesthenhadscarcelyover100
members77 andtheDistrictapopulationoffewerthan15,000 residents.78 Members
ofCongressapparentlyenvisionedasmall, cozycommunitywithresidentsreadily
minglingwiththenationalrepresentatives. Ifthatwereevertrue, itismostsurely
nottruenow.
C. Representation via Allies in Congress and Political Elites
One might look at the District and pronounce it lucky. The federal government
bailedouttheDistrictinthe1990swhenitsbondswereratedbelow junkandbank-
ruptcyloomed.79 The federal government took over the Districts pension liabilities at
autonomybill. BenPershing, D.C. Budget Autonomy Bill Pulled after Rand Paul Offers
Amendments on Guns, Abortion, Unions, WASH. POST (June 26, 2012), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dc-wire/post/rand-paul-seeks-to-change-district-laws-on
-guns-abortion-unions/2012/06/26/gJQAOTTf4V_blog.html[hereinafterPershing, Budget
Autonomy Bill Pulled] (noting that Senator Paul is one of many Republicans eager to change
the Districts laws).
73 Sommer, supra note37.
74 Pershing, Budget Autonomy Bill Pulled, supra note72.
75 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 998 (1801).
76 Id.
77 The6thCongresshad106 Representatives. Congress Profiles: 6th Congress (1799
1801), U.S.HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview
/Profiles/6th/(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
78 RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, supra note24.
79 See LisaHoffman, Odd Couple:Barry, Gingrich Find Common Ground, DALLAS
MORN. NEWS, Oct. 15, 1995, at16A;DavidA. Vise& YolandaWoodlee, $146.7Million
Loan to D.C. Approved by U.S. Treasury, WASH. POST, June23, 1995, atC3.
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thattimeaswel.80 Andthefederalgovernmentcontinues, tothisday, topayforthe
courtsystem anditsrelatedcosts.81 Districtresidentsalsoenjoythemultiplicityof
federaljobsavailableintheDistrict, althoughthetrendofthefederalgovernment
employingasignificantamountofDistrictresidentsisonthedecline.82
Intheseandotherways, theargumentruns, controlbyCongresshasbeenbenign,
evenbeneficialoverall.83 Congresss actions toward the District do not reflect deep-
seatedprejudicesoradesiretoharm apoliticallypowerlessgroup.84 Itisthisnotion
thatledtheD.C. Circuittoevaluateequalprotectiondiscriminationclaimsagainst
Congressvis-à-vistheDistrictbymererationalbasisreview.85 Inacaseinvolving
theautomaticcommitmenttomentalinstitutionsoffederalcriminaldefendantscharged
intheDistrict, United States v. Cohen, theD.C. Circuitnotedthathigher, more
rigorous standards of review are reserved for a class that is more likely than others
toreflectdeep-seatedprejudiceratherthanlegislativerationalityinpursuitofsome
legitimate objective.86 Thecourt, ledbynow-JusticeScalia, didnotfindanyreason
to believe there could be Congressional prejudice against the Districts populace.87
Moreover, then-JudgeScaliacouldnotbelievetheDistricttobepoliticalypowerless
because the Districts population included members of the political elite, such as of-
ficersofallthreebranchesofthefederalgovernment.88 Thesepoliticaleliteswould
presumablylookoutfortheinterestsoftheDistrict.89
This line of thinking mirrors the Supreme Courts approach to discrimination
againstthementallydisabled. InCleburne v. Cleburne LivingCenter,90 theSupreme
80 MikeDebonis, D.C.s Pensions Are Looking Pretty, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/mike-debonis/wp/2013/03/11/d-c-s-pensions-are
-looking-pretty/.
81 ZoeTillman, D.C. Courts to Furlough One-Third of Employees DuringShutdown,
LEGALTIMES (Oct. 1, 2013), htp://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/10/dc-courts-to-furlough
-one-third-of-employees-during-shutdown.html.
82 JenniferLiberto, Washington D.C. Jobs:Ground Zero for Budget Cuts, CNN MONEY
(Feb.7,2013),htp:/money.cnn.com/2013/02/07/news/economy/washington-dc-jobs-budget/.
83 See, e.g., Debonis, supra note 80 ([I]t helps, to a great degree, that the city has the
benefit of Congressional oversight. . . .); John Connor, House Panel Votes for Unit to
Oversee Districts Finances, WALLST. J., Mar. 31, 1995, at B7 (Rep. Joe Scarborough(R.,
Fla.), said Congress is demanding that the city do something the federal government hasnt
done in more than 25 years: balance its budget.).
84 See Hoffman, supra note 79 (Gingrich sees his job is to fix the city, not run roughshod
over it.).
85 United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 13236 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
86 Id. at134 (quotingPlylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)).
87 See id. at136 (applyingrationalbasisreview tolawsaffectingDistrictresidents).
88 Id. at135.
89 Id. (It is, in any event, fanciful to consider as politically powerless a city whose resi-
dentsincludeahighproportionoftheofficesofallthreebranchesofthefederalgovernment,
and their staffs.).
90 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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Courtappliedrationalbasisreview tolawsgivingdisparatetreatmenttomentally
disabledpersonsonthetheorythatmostsuchlawswereeitherhelpfulorbenignand
thatsuchpersonswerenottrulypowerless.91 Theyhadproxiessuchasparentsand
interestgroupswhocoulddefendtheirinterestsinthepoliticalmarketplace.92
Notonlyaresuchargumentsinherentlydemeaninginthattheysuggestthat
Districtresidentsarenotfullycapableofrepresentingtheirowninterests, butthey
mistaketheconsequencesoffederalcontrol. Itisnotalwaysgenerousorbenign. It
can, andhasbeen, quiteharmfulandintrusive. Asdescribedabove, politiciansuse
theDistricttotesttheirpetpoliciesandpushfortheiragendas, ignoringthedesires
ofDistrictresidents.93
Moreover, theideathatDistrictresidentsareadequatelyrepresentedbypolitical
elites, asthen-JudgeScaliacontended,94 isquitenaïve. Yes, itistruethatsomemem-
bersofthethreebranchesofthefederalgovernmentliveintheDistrict, butthey
makeuponlyatinypercentageofthe646,000 residentsandtheirbehaviormostly
evincesindifferencetoDistrictissues.95 Thisisajurisdictioninwhichmostresidents
areordinarycitizenswithnoprofessionalconnectiontothefederalgovernment.96
It is true that the District has been granted Home Rule by Congress.97 Under
theHomeRuleAct, Districtresidentselectamayorandathirteen-memberCouncil.98
TheActprovidestheDistrictwithlegislativepowersoverDistrictaffairsconsistent
withsomeofthepowersheldbythestates.99 Usingthesepowers, inrecentyearsthe
Councilhasenactedsuchprogressivelegislationasmarriageequality, decriminalizing
marijuana, creatingarighttoshelter, andprovidingdriverlicensestoundocumented
immigrants.100 Nevertheless, theHomeRuleActreservesanumberofimportant
91 Id. at 44546. The rational basis review in Cleburne wasactuallystrongerthanthe
rationalbasisinCohen becauseitwasreallywhathascome to be termed as rational basis
with bite. See, e.g., GayleLynnPettinga, Rational Basis with Bite:Intermediate Scrutiny
by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779,78087 (1987) (tracing the evolution of rational basis
with bite as a fourth standard of review).
92 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at445 ([T]he legislative response, which could hardly have occurred
andsurvivedwithoutpublicsupport, negatesanyclaimthatthementallyretardedarepolitically
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.).
93 See supra PartII.B.
94 Cohen, 733 F.2dat135.
95 Anobservationbasedonmythirty-plusyearsintheDistrictandeightyearsonthe
CounciloftheDistrictofColumbia.
96 See Raskin, supra note38, at420 n.18.
97 See generally HomeRuleAct, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
98 Id. §§ 40113, 42123.
99 Id. §302.
100 Indeed, the Councils structure as a unicameral legislative body of only thirteen
membersmayhelptheDistrictpasssuchprogressivelegislationmoreefficientlythanstate
legislativebodies, whicharealmostallbicameral. See MikeDebonis, Is D.C. Overgoverned?
Or Undergoverned?, WASH.POST (Feb. 3, 2011, 9:00 PM), htp://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/03/AR2011020307010.html.
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powersforCongressandthefederalgovernment. Forinstance, judgesofDistrict
courtsareappointedbythePresidentoftheUnitedStateswiththeadviceandcon-
sentoftheSenate.101 Congressalsoreservesforitselfconsiderableoversightofthe
District;theHomeRuleActinnowaybluntstheapplicationoftheDistrictClause
intheConstitution.102 Additionally, Congressdelineatedseveralareasoverwhich
theCouncilcannotlegislate, includingaprohibitiononimposinganyincometaxon
non-DistrictresidentswhoworkintheDistrict.103 AswelcomeastheHomeRule
Actmaybe, theessentialdefectremains. AnythingtheDistrictisempoweredtodois
atthesufferanceofCongress. AndwhatDistrictresidentshavegainedundertheHome
RuleAct, theymaylosejustasreadily, giventhattheHomeRuleActitselfstates:
[T]heCongressoftheUnitedStatesreservestheright, atany
time, toexerciseitsconstitutionalauthorityaslegislatureforthe
District, byenactinglegislationfortheDistrictonanysubject,
whetherwithinorwithoutthescopeoflegislativepowergranted
totheCouncilbythisAct, includinglegislationtoamendorrepeal
anylaw inforceintheDistrictpriortoorafterenactmentofthis
ActandanyactpassedbytheCouncil.104
Onepalliativetothissubordinatestateofaffairsmightbefoundintheview thatthe
Districts position with Congress is no better or worse than any local governments
relationshiptoitsstategovernment. Underconventionallocalgovernmenttheory,
towns, cities, and counties are creatures of the state and, as such, they may be
empoweredorabolishedorcontrolledbythestateinavarietyofways.105 Onemight
see an analogy with the District vis-à-vis Congress. Municipalities get to act like
localgovernmentsbutonlyinsofarastheyaregivenpermissionbythesuperior
entity, thestate.106 TheDistrictgetstoactlikealocalgovernmentunder Home
Rule, but only insofar as given permission by Congress.107 Districtresidents, the
notionruns, shouldconsiderthemselvesasamunicipalitytoCongress. However,
theessentialerrorinthisanalogyisthattheDistrictisnotsimilarlysituatedtoa
local government and its state because the District has no equal voteindeed no
vote at allin the legislative chamber that controls it.
101 HomeRuleActat§433(a).
102 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 17;HomeRuleActat§601 (reservingtherightfor
CongresstocontinueexercisingitsconstitutionalauthoritytolegislatefortheDistrict).
103 See HomeRuleActat§602(a)(5).
104 Id. §601.
105 See Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868) (Municipal corporations . . .
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.).
106 See id.
107 See supra notes 10103 and accompanying text.
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III. GETTING TO STATEHOOD
Because the Districts subordination can only be fuly cured by joining the ranks
ofstates, thequestionishow canthatbedone? Commentatorsandsupportersof
statehoodhaveofferedseveralavenuestoachievestatehoodor, atleast, toachievea
closeresemblancetostatehood. Onlytwoofferthechanceforauthenticstatehood, and
alfacesignificantobstacles.
A. Pseudo or Nominal Statehood
From early in the Republics history, there has been debate over whether the
Districtwasnominalyastate.108 Proponentsofnominalstatehoodarguethatbecause
certainwordsintheConstitutiondonothavearigid, inflexiblemeaning, useofthe
word state in the Constitution can encompass the District.109 AlthoughinHepburn
v. Ellzey, the Supreme Court initialy rejected this idea, holding that state has only
onemeaning,110 theCourtlatersaid, inLoughborough v. Blake, thattheDistrictcould
betreatedasifitwereastate, atleastforthepurposesoflayingtaxespursuantto
Article1, Section2.111 TheCourtlaterextendedthisthinkingtootherclauses,112
adopting the view that, [w]hether the District of Columbia constitutes a State or
Territory within the meaning of any particular statutory or constitutional provision
depends upon the character and aim of the specific provision involved.113
Seizingonthisapproach, ProfessorPeterRaven-Hansen, amongothers, argues
thattheCourtshouldusethetheoryofnominalstatehoodtopermittheDistricttobe
astateforthepurposesofsecuringrepresentationintheHouseofRepresentatives
pursuanttoArticle1, Section2.114 Buttheargumentmetstrongheadwindsinthecase
ofAdams v. Clinton, inwhichtheD.C. Circuitrejectedtheideaoutright,115 andthe
SupremeCourtaffirmedwithoutanopinion.116 Moreover, treatingtheDistrictasa
108 ThisdebatereachedtheleveloftheSupremeCourtwithHepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (1
Cranch) 445 (1805).
109 Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation, supra note1, at179.
110 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 45253 (1805).
111 See 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 317, 31820, 32225 (1820).
112 See, e.g., Stoutenburghv. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 147 (1888);Callanv. Wilson, 127
U.S. 540, 54849 (1887).
113 DistrictofColumbiav. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973).
114 Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation, supra note 1, at 18485. However, an
interpretationfindingtheDistrictastateforpurposesofArticle1, Section2 representation
could easily apply to Article 1, Section 3, which provides for two senators from each state.
Thiswouldbeanevenmoredifficultinterpretivecasetomake.
115 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, at 3536, 5556, 6162 (D.D.C. 2000), affd, 531 U.S. 941 (2000)
(also rejecting the plaintiffs claims for representationunderthetheoriesofequalprotection,
privilegesandimmunities, dueprocess, andtherepublicanguaranteeclause).
116 531 U.S. 941 (2000).
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stateforsomeclausesoftheConstitutionisaruleofconstruction. Itwouldhaveno
effect on Congresss express powers under the District Clause117 tocontrolDistrict
affairsineveryparticular.118 CourtshaveinterpretedtheDistrictClausebroadly, find-
ing Congress can act as a legislature of national character over the District and is
notconstrainedbythelimitsonstatelegislatures.119
Neverthelessthetheoryofnominalorpseudostatehoodmayhaveutilityinpur-
suingactualstatehood. Thatis, themoreoccasionstherearetothinkoftheDistrict
asastate, themorelikelytheideaoftruestatehoodmaytakehold.120
B. Diluted Statehood:Retrocession to Maryland
AnadditionalwaytosecuretherightsandbenefitsofstatehoodforDistrictresi-
dentswouldbetoretrocedeDistrictlandtoMaryland. JustasCongressretroceded
ArlingtonandAlexandriabacktoVirginiain1846, somecommentatorsadvocatefor
retrocessionoftheDistrict, savefortheNationalCapitalServiceArea, toMaryland.121
ThiswouldgrantDistrictresidentstherightsandprivilegesoflivinginastatewith-
outactuallyforminganew state.122 Withthisplan, Congresswouldretaindominion
overlandleftasthenationalcapital.123
Theprecedentofretrocedingnow-ArlingtonandAlexandriacountiestoVirginia
illustrateshow thiswouldbeaccomplished. Theretrocessioninvolvedtheapproval
ofthreeparties: thepeopleofAlexandriaCounty, theCommonwealthofVirginia,
andtheUnitedStatesCongress.124 Inthe1830s, residentsofthelandcededtothe
117 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 17.
118 Under the District Clause, Congress can exploit the Districts lack of autonomy for
politicalgainandactcontrarytothedesiresofDistrictresidents. Forinstance, inthe1990s,
CongresspassedtheBarrAmendment, whichprohibitedtheDistrictfrom spendinganyfunds
onmarijuanalegalizationballotinitiatives, preventingDistrictresidentsfrom voicingtheir
opinionsonthesubjectattheballotbox. Turnerv. D.C. Bd. ofElections& Ethics, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 25, 27, 30 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting in dicta that Congresss attempt to interfere with
District residents ability to express their legislative preferences through their votes infringed
on the crux of the democratic system); Bill Miller & Spencer S. Hsu, Results Are Out:
Marijuana Initiative Passes, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1999, atA1.
119 Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246, 25051 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (noting that
while the dormant Commerce Clause constrains the states, it does not limit Congresss ability
tolegislatefortheDistrict);see Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 39798 (1973).
WhenCongresstreatstheDistrictinadiscriminatoryway, applyingstandardsdifferentfrom
thoseappliedforstates, suchtreatmentstandsprovideditmeetsawatered-downversionof
rational basis scrutiny. United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 13236 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see
infra PartIII.C.
120 See infra PartV.
121 Garg, supra note61, at14.
122 Id.
123 See id.
124 Barnes, supra note29, at59.
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Districtfrom Virginia, thenknownasAlexandriaCounty, grew increasinglydis-
satisfiedwiththeirsituation.125 Theydidnotperceivethemselvesasreceivinganyof
theeconomicbenefitstherestoftheDistrictresidentswerereceiving, evenasthey
sufferedthelossoftheprivilegesofbeingacitizenofastate.126 In1840, Alexandria
CountyvotedinfavorofretrocessiontoVirginia,127 andin1846, Congressapproved
retrocession, notingthatVirginiahadalsosignaleditswillingnesstotakebackthe
land.128 In the opening line of Congresss legislation, Congress noted that no more
territoryoughttobeheldundertheexclusivelegislationgiventoCongressoverthe
DistrictwhichistheseatoftheGeneralGovernmentthanmaybenecessaryand
proper for the purposes of such a seat.129 TheSupremeCourtapprovedtheretroces-
sioninPhillips v. Payne whenaresidentofthatcountychallengedtheassessment
ofVirginiapropertytaxesagainsthim.130
FollowingtheprecedentestablishedbytheVirginiaretrocession, retroceding
toMarylandwouldentailapprovaloftheretrocessionbyDistrictvotersandMaryland
votersandanactofCongress.131 Congresswouldshrinkthenationalseatofgovern-
menttoafederalenclavecomprisingtheCapitol, theWhiteHouse, SupremeCourt,
nationalmonuments, andadjacentfederalbuildings. TheConstitutionplacesamaxi-
mum size for the seat of government (not exceeding ten Miles square), but it does
notplaceaminimum sizeontheDistrict.132 Some critics advance the fixed form
argumenttoopposethisreading, arguingthatastrictconstructionoftheDistrictClause
means once the cession was made and this district became the seat of government,
the authority of Congress over its size and location seems to have been exhausted.133
However, the Virginia precedent and the Courts approval of that retrocession in
Phillips fatallyweakensthisasaviableargument.
Moreover, the Framers primary concerns that led to the creation of the District no
longerstand. Thereasonforhavinganationalseatofgovernmentunderthepurview
of Congress alone purportedly comes from the Continental Congresss early experience
125 Id. at16 (citingMarkDavidRichards, The Debates over Retrocession, 18012004,
WASH. HIST., Spring/Summer2004 at52).
126 Id. (citingRichards, supra note125). AtthetimetheDistrictwascreatedfrom Virginia
andMaryland, theFramersbelievedtheselectedsitewouldbenefitfrom $500,000 being
spentthereannually.
127 Barnes, supra note29, at16 (citingRichards, supra note125, at67).
128 AnActtoRetrocedetheCountyofAlexandria, intheDistrictofColumbia, totheState
ofVirginia, ch. 35, 9 Stat. 35 (1846).
129 Id.
130 92 U.S. 130 (1875).
131 See Barnes, supra note29, at59.
132 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 17.
133 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL: THE QUESTION OF STATEHOOD FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 18 (1987);see
also PeterRaven-Hansen, The Constitutionality of D.C. Statehood, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
160, 16770 (1991) [hereinafter Raven-Hansen, Constitutionality of Statehood].
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inPhiladelphia.134 Asdescribedabove, thisexperienceofalocalgovernmentbeing
abletoholdpoweroverthefederallegislatureleddraftersoftheConstitutiontode-
sire the nations seat of government to be a place of exclusive federal jurisdiction.135
Thisexperiencesuggeststhedraftershadthethoughtofpreservingpolicepowers
overtheDistrictattheforefrontoftheirminds, whichexplainswhytheyvestedbroad
authorityovertheDistrictinCongress.136 But, retrocedingthislandtoMaryland
wouldstillleavethefederalenclavecontainingtheseatofnationalgovernmentfully
under Congresss control.137
TheTwenty-ThirdAmendmentpresentsanotherpossibleobstacletoretrocession.
TheAmendmentprovidesforatleastthreeelectoralvotesforpresidentialelectionsfor
theDistrict.138 Retrocedingthislandwouldmakethisamendmentredundantbecause
MarylandalreadyhasitsownelectoralvotesasprovidedundertheConstitution;but
theremainingfederalenclave, accordingtocritics, wouldalsocontinuetohaveits
three electoral votes, even though only the First Family would now live in the nations
seatofgovernment.139 CriticsarguethatanactofCongresscannotrepealaconstitu-
tionalamendment.140 However, ProfessorRaven-Hansenarguesstatehoodwould
likelymaketheTwenty-ThirdAmendmentmoot, eitherbymakingitnolongerap-
plicabletotheDistrictorbyimpliedlyrepealingit.141 Byeffectivelydivestingthe
nationalenclaveofanyvoters, theTwenty-ThirdAmendmentwouldsimplybein-
applicableratherthanrepealed, thusavoidinganyconstitutionalobstacle.142
ItisunclearwhetherMarylandwouldembracetheopportunitytoannexthe
District. Marylandwouldgainastrongeconomiccenter,143 andretrocessionwould
alsominimizethepossibilityoftheDistrictimposinganincometaxonMaryland
residentsworkingintheDistrict.144 But, annexationwouldalsobringchallenging
134 See supra PartII.A.
135 Id.
136 Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation, supra note 1, at 17072, 178 ([T]he
Districtwascreatedfortherelativelynarrowpurposeofpreservingnationalpoliceauthority
and jurisdiction at the seat of the government.). This concern with who had control of
securityattheseatofgovernmentsuggestsonereasonwhythedraftersdidnotpaymuch
attentiontotherepresentationquestionoffutureDistrictresidents. Id. at 17273. Another
reasonwhyrepresentationreceivedlittleattentionisbecausethedraftersassumedstatesceding
landtothefederalgovernmentfortheDistrictwouldmakeprovisionsfortherepresentation
ofDistrictresidentsintheactsofcession. Id. at172.
137 Barnes, supra note 29, at 2425, 28.
138 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
139 Raven-Hansen, Constitutionality of Statehood, supra note 133, at 18384.
140 Id. at 18486.
141 Id. at 18489.
142 Id.
143 See supra notes 4752 and accompanying text.
144 PhilipG. Schrag, The Future of District of Columbia Home Rule, 39 CATH. U. L.REV.
311, 321 (1990).
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educationproblems, significantpovertyandhomelessnessrates, andothersocialils.145
And, itiscertainlyquestionablewhetherannexationisbeneficialfororpreferredby
theDistrict. TheDistrictwouldnotenjoyanidentityasitsownstate. Instead, itwould
besubsumedbyMarylandandwouldhavetoreorganizeitselfaccordingtoMaryland
law. AlthoughtheDistrictwouldfinallyenjoycongressionalrepresentationaspartof
the Maryland delegation, the Districts interests do not always align with Marylands
interests. DistrictresidentssimplydonotidentifyasMarylanders. Retrocessionwould
requireaculturalshiftaswellasapoliticalshift, anditwoulddilutethepolitical
powerandautonomyoftheDistrict.146
C. Authentic Paths to Statehood
TheDistrictcanachieveauthenticstatehoodeitherbyanactofCongressorby
aconstitutionalamendment.
1. CreatingtheStateofNew Columbia
BesideshavingthepowertograntrepresentationtotheDistrict, Congressalso
hasthepowertocreatethestateofNew ColumbiaoutofDistrictland.147 Congress
couldshrinktheseatofgovernmenttoanareacontainingonlytheCapitolbuilding,
theWhiteHouse, SupremeCourt, nationalmonuments, andadjacentfederalbuild-
ings.148 TheremainingDistrictlandwouldbecomethestateofNew Columbia149 via
Congresss power to admit new states to the Union.150 Theonlyconstitutionallyre-
quiredstepsfortheprocessofadmitinganewstatewouldbeanadmissionbilpassed
byCongressandpresentmentofthatbilltothepresident.151
Theadvantageofthisapproachisthatonceaterritory, or, inthiscasetheDistrict,
becomesastate, itsstatehoodcannotbetakenaway.152 Despitetheobviousadvantages,
some commentators question whether creating a new state out of the District would
destroytheoriginalconceptoftheSeatofGovernmentbeingindependentfrom any
state.153 But, Congresswouldstillmaintainexclusivecontroloftheareadesignated
thecapital.154 Additionally, asdescribedabove, thereisprecedentforshrinkingthe
145 Raven-Hansen, Constitutionality of Statehood, supra note133, at161.
146 Id. at 16162; Schrag, supra note 144, at 32122 n.58, 322.
147 Garg, supra note61, at11.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3.
151 Constitutional and Economic Issues Raised by D.C. Statehood:Hearingon H.R. 325
Before the Subcomm. On Fiscal Affairs and Health of the H. Comm. on the District of
Columbia, 99thCong. 35 (1986) (statementofProf. Raven-Hansen).
152 Barnes, supra note29, at24.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 2425, 28.
84 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:65
sizeoftheDistrict.155 Althoughtheshrunkenterritorywouldgotocreateanew state
ratherthananexistingstate, thisdifferenceisnotproblematic. TheFramerswerecon-
cernedabouttheproximityofanystatetotheseatofnationalgovernment;underthis
logic, itshouldnotmatterwhetherthestateisoneoftheoriginalcoloniesoranewly
createdone.
TheHouseintroducedabilltoachievethisresultin1993, butitsuffered a 277153
defeataftertwodaysoffloordebate.156 Atthetime, therewerequestionsoftheconsti-
tutionalityofsuchlegislationbecauseofitspossiblerelationshiptotheTwenty-Third
Amendment.157 However, justastheTwenty-ThirdAmendmentshouldnotpresentan
obstacletoretrocession, itshouldnotpresentanobstacletocreatinganew state. The
creationofNew ColumbiawouldmaketheTwenty-ThirdAmendmenteithermoot
ornolongerapplicablebecausetherewouldnotbeanyvotersremaininginthefed-
eralenclave.158
Thetrueobstacletothisapproachispolitical;topassanenablingacttocreatethe
stateofNewColumbia, thelegislationmusthavebipartisansupport. ManyRepublicans
appearunlikelytosupportlegislationcreatinganewstateofastaunchlyDemocratic
area. IftheDistrictwereabletosendtwoadditionalDemocraticsenatorstotheSenate,
itwouldupsetthecurrentpoliticalbalance, makingitmoredifficultforRepublicans
to either achieve or maintain a majority. These political calculations make such a bills
passageunlikely. Atthemoment, theNewColumbiaAdmissionActsitsincommittees
inboththeHouseandtheSenate, butprognosticatorsaccordthebilsaslim chance
ofpassage.159 Ifsuchabillcouldnotpassinthe1990s, itisunlikelytopassnow when
Congresshasgrownincreasinglypartisan.
2. PassingaConstitutionalAmendmentforEitherStatehoodorRepresentation
AlthoughnothingintheConstitutionexpresslydeniesCongressthepowertoeither
maketheDistrictastateorgrantitrepresentation, somebelieveachievingeitherof
thesegoalsrequiresaConstitutionalamendment.160 Appealingly, aconstitutional
amendmentwouldbebothlegallyandpoliticallysound.161 Unlikeastatutegranting
representationorgreaterautonomy, aconstitutionalamendmentcouldnotbeeasily
155 See supra PartV.B.
156 Garg, supra note 61, at 1112.
157 Id.
158 Raven-Hansen, Constitutionality of Statehood, supra note 133, at 18489.
159 H.R. 292:NewColumbia Admission Act, GOVTRACK, htps://www.govtrack.us/congress
/bills/113/hr292 (lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014) (givingtheHousebillasevenpercentchanceof
enactment);S. 132:New Columbia Admission Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/113/s132 (lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014) (givingtheSenatebillaseventeenpercent
chanceofenactment).
160 See Garg, supra note 61, at 2427 (delineating the various arguments against the con-
stitutionalityofastatutegrantingrepresentation).
161 Id. at26.
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repealedwhenpartypowerchangesinCongress. Nevertheless, passingaconstitu-
tionalamendmentisalwaysanuphilbatle. TheD.C. VotingRightsAmendmentwas
proposedinCongressin1978.162 ItwouldhavetreatedtheDistrictasastate, secur-
ingforitfullCongressionalrepresentation, fullparticipationintheElectoralCollege
system, andfullparticipationintheconstitutionalamendmentprocess.163 Although
itpassedboththeHouseandtheSenatebysupermajorities, itfailedtoberatifiedby
asufficientnumberofstates.164 Becausethebillprovidedforaseven-yearratification
period, theAmendmentwouldonceagainhavetopasstheHouseandSenateifanyone
triedtoreviveit.165
ThedifficultyinratifyinganamendmentsecuringstatehoodfortheDistricthas
onlyincreasedsincethe1970s.166 First, the1970samendmentdidnotsecurefull
statehoodfortheDistrict.167 Theinabilitytoratifythisamendmentbyasufficient
numberofstatessuggeststhatanamendmentsecuringfullstatehoodfortheDistrict
wouldhaveanevensmalerchanceatratification. Second, thepoliticallandscapein
Congresshaschangeddramaticallysincethe1970s. Theabilitytosecureenoughsup-
porttopassanamendmentintheHouseandSenateisgreatlydiminished, particu-
larlywhen, asdescribedabove, theoutcomewoulddramaticallychangethepolitical
balanceintheSenate.
IV. ON THE WAY TO STATEHOOD: THE ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES OF INCREMENTALISM
IftheDistrictistoachieveauthenticstatehoodviaanactofCongressoraconsti-
tutional amendment, the public needs to be educated and engaged in the Districts
plight, supportersmustbepersistentinlobbyingCongress, andDistrictresidentsand
theirlocalandnationalaliesmustpursueavigorouspubliccampaignakintocivil
rightsstrugglesofold. Thisislikelytobeadifficultandlong-term project, andinthe
meantime, theDistrictfacesastrategicdilemma: shouldtheresidentspursueanincre-
mentalapproachtograduallyachievegreaterautonomyandsomevotingrepresenta-
tioninCongress? Orshouldtheyholdoutforstatehoodexclusively?
Underanincrementalapproach, theendgoalwouldremainstatehood, butadvo-
cateswouldpursueastep-by-stepapproach, graduallyposturingtheDistrictasifit
wereastate.168 Thishasalreadybeenhappeninginactionsrealandsymbolic. The
DistrictexercisesmanypowersofastateundertheHomeRuleAct,169 andithasvoted
162 H.R.J. Res. 554, 95thCong. (1978).
163 Id.
164 Barnes, supra note29, at37.
165 H.R.J. Res. 554, 95thCong. (1978).
166 See id.
167 Barnes, supra note 29, at 3738.
168 See Schrag, supra note144, at322.
169 See supra PartIII.C.
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toassumeautonomyoveritslocalbudget.170 The Districts lawyer is no longer referred
to as corporation counsel but as attorney general,171 andsomeelectedofficials
havesuggestedthattheMayorandCouncilbecalledthegovernorandlegislature.172
AnentirelobbyingefforthascoalescedaroundachievingavoteinCongressforthe
Districts delegate, and one of the most visible and active District groups is DC Vote,
which, for years, has made the delegates vote its main objective.173 Theadvantagesof
incrementalism arethatitmightpositivelychange public perceptions of the Districts
abilitytogovernitself, thatCongresswouldultimatelyseestatehoodasmorepalatable
andlessthreatening, andthat, inthemeantime, theresidentswould, infact, acquire
greaterautonomyandcontrolovertheirlocalaffairs.
Butincrementalism carriesdisadvantagesandrisks. Thefirstisthefrustration
thatwillcomeifgreaterautonomyisconferredandthensnatchedbackbyanew set
ofCongressionaloverseers. SecondisthedangerofcompromisestheDistrictmaybe
forcedtomakeformodestandalwayscontingentadvances, compromisesthatthem-
selves cement the Districts second class status and teach the wrong lesson about the
politicalmaturityoftheDistrict. Inthisregard, considerthelegislationproposedinthe
late2000sthatwouldhavesecuredavotingrepresentativeintheHouseofRepresenta-
tivesfortheDistrict. OnApril18, 2007, theHousepassedtheDistrictofColumbia
VotingRightsActof2007, whichwouldhaveprovidedforasingleCongressional
districtfortheDistrictofColumbia.174 Toappeasethosewhoworriedthiswould
throwoffthepoliticalbalanceintheHouse, thebillwouldhaveincreasedtheHouse
from 435 to437 seats, addinganextraseatforUtahaswell.175 BecausetheDistrict
isreliablyDemocraticandUtahisreliablyRepublican, thiswouldhavepreservedthe
balance. Unfortunately, theSenateversionofthebillfailedtopass.176 Thebillwas
170 See EmmaDumain, Voters Pass D.C.s Budget Autonomy Referendum, Many Ask
Now What?, ROLL CALL (Apr. 24, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/voters
_pass_dcs_budget_autonomy_referendum_many_ask_now_what-224328-1.html.
171 Mayor Renames OCC to Office of the Attorney General for DC, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEYGEN. (May26, 2004), htp:/oag.dc.gov/release/mayor-renames-occ-office-atorney
-general-dc.
172 See MikeDeBonis, Why Does the D.C. Council Have 13Members?, WASH. POST
(Feb. 7, 2011, 5:58 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/2011/02/why_does_the
_dc_council_have_1.html;LoriMontgomery, Gov. Williams, If You Please, WASH. POST,
Mar. 2, 2006, atB1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2006/03/01/AR2006030102320.html.
173 Mission, DCVOTE, htps://www.dcvote.org/dc-votes-mission-work(lastvisitedOct. 23,
2014);see also Sommer, supra note37 (describingeffortsofshadow delegationandother
individualsoutsideDistrictgovernmenttopromotestatehood).
174 H.R. 1905, 110thCong. §2 (2007).
175 Id. §3;KatePhillips, Senate Passes D.C. Voting Rights Bill, 6137, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 2009), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/senate-passes-dc-voting
-rights-bill-61-37.
176 S. 1257(110th):District of Columbia House VotingRights Act of 2007, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s1257#overview (lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
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introducedagainintheHouseandSenatein2009.177 Thistime, itpassedtheSenate.178
However, it included a hastily added amendment repealing most of the Districts gun
controllaws.179 AlthoughmoderateHouseDemocratswerewilingtopassthebillwith
theamendment, D.C. votingrightsadvocatesdemandedacleanbill.180 Eventually,
DelegateEleanorHolmesNorton, whointroducedthebill, agreedwithMajorityLeader
StenyHoyertotablethebil, findingtheamendmenttobetoodifficulttoswalow.181
Thisexperienceillustratesthekindsofcompromisesanincrementalapproachwould
forceDistrictresidentstoaccept. WhentheDistrictmustgiveuponeform ofauton-
omytosecureanotherform ofautonomy, thereisneitheragainforresidentsnor
movementforward.
Thefinalandmostworrisomedisadvantageofincrementalism isthatitssuccess
maysapthefervorforstatehoodanddilutetheargumentsthatmay, inpurerform,
ultimatelywin. Thisisparticularlytrueoftheefforttosecureavoteforthedelegate
intheHouseofRepresentatives. Ifsuchavotewererecognized, opponentsofstate-
hoodcouldthenarguethattheDistrictdoeshaveavoteandone, intheiropinion,
more commensurate with the Districts geographic size and population. Supporters
would lose their greatest rhetorical weapontaxation without representation. Its
much easier to make ones case by saying, we have no vote in Congress, than it
would be to say, we have a vote but want more votes.
Thedilemmaofincrementalism maybesolvedbytakingwhatworkstoposture
theDistrictasastate, suchasbudgetautonomy, butholdingoutforfulandpermanent
votingrights, whichcanonlybeachievedbystatehood.
CONCLUSION
ThisSymposium wasdedicatedtodefiningandevaluatingdifferentaspectsof
democraticrepresentation, suchasexpresslyadoptingaconstitutionalrighttovote.
ButthereisoneissuethatisuniqueinthisSymposium, andthatistheanomalous
secondclassstatusofthepeopleofWashington, D.C. Althoughhistoricallyexplica-
ble, the Districts status is no longer politically or morally defensible. But there is
a complete remedy: statehood. The Districts population, resources, and democratic
commitmententitleittostatehood. AndfortheDistrict, onlystatehoodwilldo.
177 S. 160(111th):District of Columbia House VotingRights Act of 2009, GOVTRACK,
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